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Abstract 
Threat evaluation is an uncertainty process to protect the assets against the various enemy targets such as aircrafts, missiles, 
helicopters etcetera. There is one critical thing in threat evaluation of targets is threat level or degree of threat which depends 
upon the enemy targets and their change in behaviors at instant, because each target has individual behavior. Analysis of 
individual behavior of the target is difficult task. So there are various parameters come into the picture which are extracted from 
multiple sensors are involved for evaluation of threat level of target to improve situational awareness and decision making. 
Threat level evaluation is complex task because of uncertainty involved in the process. In uncertainty case involved in threat 
evaluation process, Bayesian Network has great deal to overcome uncertainty in the model. 
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1. Introduction  
Threat evaluation can employ defensive as well offensive against possible enemy targets such as bomber, fighter, 
and transporter. But some of the countries who want to keep peace and protect their nation and places. All places are 
act as assets like air bases, tourist places, bridges, camps, nuclear power plants, command post, harbors, radars, 
monuments, parliament’s buildings, and etcetera. Threat value has an important factor to protect their nation against 
enemy nations. Threat evaluation facilitates to make right decision and better situation awareness in war scenario. 
Commanders can build decision easily if they manage only one information as threat value. But it is not a real 
situation where gets only one information about targets.  
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The decision making will be difficult task and also very critical with respect to available resources and time, 
when commanders get many number of information as evidences. In this situation, uncertainty in decision comes 
into the picture. Various factors are considered for a decision making augmented with human cognitive intelligence. 
An expert system built with the help of Bayesian Network (BN) can play an important role in decision making 
because it overcomes involved uncertainty in a model. Commanders obtain evidences of the enemy target time to 
time. 
A main objective is to protect assets against enemy targets. Here an assumption is considered which is defending 
targets act as potential threats but targets may be friend or enemy which is decided by Identification, friend or foe 
(IFF) which is designed by command and control system. In this situation, prioritization of potential threats has an 
important factor according to threat level (Degree of threat) of detected enemy targets via multi-resources. 
Intelligent sensors provide the classification of target type at time to time as evidence. Threat value is a factor which 
decides level of dangerous threat through predicting the threat value of detected targets. Higher threat value will 
give higher level of dangerous and vice-versa. On the other hand, threat value is proportional to level of dangerous. 
Quantification of dangerous threat is difficult task when multi-sensors provide multi- information. Commanders are 
also facing problem to decide which target is more dangerous because of uncertainty involved in it. Threat will be 
very useful to decide engaging available weapon against enemy targets. 
Threat evaluation is high level information fusion process in Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) as shown in 
Fig. 1. For analyzing threat value, it is complicated to select which parameters and which algorithms are suitable for 
threat evaluation because building of mathematical formula by using selected parameters as inputs to give threat 
value as output is complex process. In this situation, Bayesian Network approach has great candidate to evaluate 
threat value. 
2. Threat evaluation 
Threat is an expression of intension to inflict evil, injury, or damage [1-11]. Threat evaluation is a process based 
on defending targets to defended asset; consideration to protect one asset against several defending targets but in 
real war scenario, large numbers of assets involve and several targets come to destroy expensive and valuable assets. 
It is a high level information fusion technique that belongs to three level data fusion model in JDL as shown in Fig. 
1. There is one famous model for information fusion is JDL Model. This model is conceptual model which describes 
the processes, functions and specific techniques are used for information fusion.  Data fusion is the process of 
combining data or information to estimate or predict entity states [1]. 
 
Fig. 1.  The JDL Model 
It describes how data from different multi-sources is transformed to information, this information used by 
decision makers. In our situation, data are extracted from different radar, sensors and databases. After estimation of 
information, further aggregation and improvement of information will be done and this information will help to 
build decision. The JDL model is divided into different levels. 
x  Level 0: Sub-object data assessment: Estimation and prediction of signal/object observable states on the basis of 
pixel/signal level data association and characterization; at this level, data are accessing from deferent sensors as 
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radar it may be localized or distributed. The main task of this level is to pre-process data by correcting biases and 
standardizing the input before the data is fused with other data. 
x Level 1: Object assessment/ refinement: Estimation and prediction of entity states on the basis of observation-to-
track association, continuous state estimation (e.g. kinematics) and discrete state estimation (e.g. Target type and 
ID). 
x Level 2: Situation assessment: Estimation and prediction of relations among entities, to include force structure 
and cross force relations, communications and perceptual influences, physical context, etc. 
x Level 3: Impact assessment: Estimation and prediction of effects on situations of planned or estimated/predicted 
actions by the participants; to include interactions between action plans of multiple players (e.g. assessing 
susceptibilities and vulnerabilities to estimated/predicted threat actions given one’s own planned actions) 
x Level 4: Process refinement (an element of resource management): Adaptive data acquisition and processing to 
support mission objectives. 
Decision maker might shorten the time for observation, deciding acting activities and position one step of enemy. 
The OODA loop (for observe, orient, decide, and act as shown in fig. 2.) is a concept originally applied to 
the combat operations process, often at the strategic level in military operations. It is now also often applied to 
understand commercial operations and learning processes.  
 
 
Fig. 2.  Situational Awareness OODA LOOP 
When the enemy aircraft comes into radar contact, more direct information about the speed, size, and 
manoeuvrability, of the enemy plane becomes available; unfolding circumstances take priority over radio chatter. To 
determine which of several threats that represent the highest danger is of great importance, since errors such as 
prioritizing a lesser threat as a greater threat can result in engaging the wrong target, which often will have severe 
consequences [11]. Threat evaluation helps in case of weapon assignment, and intelligence sensor support system. It 
is very important factor to analyze the behavior of enemy tactics as well as our surveillance. Vigorous situation will 
come when we evaluate wrong threat value.   
3. Threat evaluation model  
The threat evaluation model with ‘m’ number of defended assets and ‘n’ number of defending targets is proposed 
in Fig. 3. The model consists of DA(i) {ith available defended asset to protect}, DT(j) {jth attacking defending target 
detected}, DA×DT { pair of available defended assets and defending targets (DA(i),DT(j))}, Th(i,j) {threat value 
from of ith available defended asset from  jth attacking target}, Tv(j) {Overall Target value computed from equation 
(1)  for defended target DT(j)}, DA = {DA1, DA2, …, DAm} {Set of ‘m’ defending assets to  be protected}, and DT = 
{DT1, DT2, …, DTn} {Set of ‘n’ defending targets detected from radars or sensors}. Threat value Th(i,j) : (DA × 
DT)→[0 1] which lies between 0 to 1. Eq. (1) represents the overall target value  for defended asset as 
                                                                                                              (1) 
where Pv(i)’s  represent the protection value of assets lies between 0 and 1 (Pv(i)[0 1]) which is assigned by the 
decision maker. The protection value of an asset is the weight-value associated with the significance associated with 
the asset. Threat value lies in between 0 and 1. Higher threat value indicates more severe danger threat. Threat Value 
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helps in the decision making involved in the process of engaging the target. The overall threat values generate the 
knowledge which improves the situational awareness for the region of interest, which could be a city, a state, a 
nation or a continent. 
 
Fig. 3.  Asset- target pairs 
3.1.  Parameters for threat evaluation  
The variety of parameters are proposed and used by researchers for threat evaluation [1-11]. These parameters 
have varying degree of effect on the threat value. Some parameters for calculating threat value are dependent on 
other parameters. A number of parameters are discussed in [6]. 
 
Fig. 4.  CPA information 
Closest Point of Approach (CPA) is point where the distance between asset and the direction of velocity of target 
will be the shortest one as shown in Fig. 4, in which two targets (Target1 and Target2) are moving in different 
direction at particular instant with different CPA values CPA1 and CPA2. 
4. Bayesian network 
A Bayesian Network (BN) is used to model a domain containing uncertainty in some manner. This uncertainty 
can be due to imperfect understanding of the domain, incomplete knowledge of the state of the domain at the time 
where a given task is to be performed, randomness in the mechanisms governing the behavior of the domain, or a 
combination of these. The network (or graph) of a BN is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), i.e., there is no directed 
path starting and ending at the same node. A node represents either a discrete random variable with a finite number 
of states or a continuous (Gaussian distributed) random variable. Throughout this document, the terms "variable" 
and "node" are used interchangeably. The links between the nodes represent (causal) relationships between the 
nodes.  
If a node does not have any parents (i.e. no links pointing towards it), the node will contain a marginal probability 
table.  If the node is discrete, it contains a probability distribution over the states of the variable that it represents.  If 
the node is continuous, it contains a Gaussian density function (given through mean and variance parameters) for the 
random variable it represents. 
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If a node do have parents (i.e., one or more links pointing towards it), the node contains a conditional probability 
table (CPT). If the node is discrete, each cell in the CPT (or, in more general terms, the conditional probability 
function (CPF)) of a node contains a conditional probability for the node being in a specific state given a specific 
configuration of the states of its parents. Thus, the number of cells in a CPT for a discrete node equals the product of 
the number of possible states for the node and the product of the number of possible states for the parent nodes. If 
the node is continuous, the CPT contains a mean and a variance parameter for each configuration of the states of its 
discrete parents (one if there are no discrete parents) and a regression coefficient for each continuous parent for each 
configuration of the states of the discrete parents. 
Let G =(V,E) be a Directed Acyclic Graph (or DAG), and let X = (Xv), v א V be a set of random 
variables indexed by V. 
x Factorization definition:  
X is a Bayesian network with respect to G if its joint probability density function (with respect to a product 
measure) (2) can be written as a product of the individual density functions, conditional on their parent variables: 
                                                                                                                                (2) 
where pa(v) is the set of parents of v (i.e. those vertices pointing directly to v via a single edge).For any set of 
random variables, the probability of any member of a joint distribution (3) can be calculated from conditional 
probabilities using the chain rule (given a topological ordering of X) as follows: 
                                                                   
                                                                                            (3) 
5. Implementation 
There are different kinds of algorithms and models for threat evaluation can be tested and analyzed. We have 
developed a threat evaluation model based on a Bayesian Network. A reason for selecting out with a Bayesian 
network approach is its abilities to handle uncertainty, which most often is a central aspect in a battle field 
environment. 
A Bayesian network characterizes a problem domain consisting of a set of random variables U = {X1, ...,Xn}. 
These variables are in the Bayesian network represented as a set of corresponding nodes (vertices) V in an acyclic 
directed graph G = (V,E), where the set of edges E(VxV) specifies (conditional) independence and dependence 
relations that hold between variables within the domain. Given the graph structure G, a joint probability distribution 
P in Eq. (4) over U can be calculated from a set of local probability distributions associated with each node1 Xi, 
using the chain rule of Bayesian networks. 
                                                                                                         (4) 
where the set of local probability distributions consists of the distributions in the product of conditional probabilities 
(with pai we refer to an assignment of values to the parent set PAi of node Xi). 
The joint probability distribution can be seen as a function assigning a number in the range [0, 1] to each possible 
combination of states of variables describing the domain. The strength of Bayesian networks is their ability to 
represent joint probability distributions in a compact manner, due to their encoding of conditional independences 
between different variables in the domain. 
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Fig. 5.  Bayesian Network Model of Threat Evaluation 
 
The structure of the actual Bayesian network looks like in Fig. 5. The random variable (node) of main interest 
here is the query variable Threat, i.e., we want to calculate the posterior probability of Threat being in state true 
given some evidence on our information variables. This posterior probability P(Threat = true|z) is our assessed 
threat value of the pair (DTi,DAj), for which the set of observations, z, holds. DTi stands for defended targets, and 
DAi stands for defending assets. 
The threat variable is directly dependent upon the mediating variables Intent and Capability, which is consistent 
with the view that threat is a combination of capability and intent as shown in Fig. 5. Capability is in its turn 
dependent upon Target type and whether the defended asset is within the target's weapon envelope or not (Weapon 
Envelope). The target's intent is according to the structure the cause of the Euclidean distance between the target and 
the defended asset (Distance), as well as of the Time Before Hit (TBH) (e.g. total time from target to CPA, and CPA 
to asset). 
 
Fig. 6.  Bayesian Network with Monitor Windows of Threat EvaluationP(threat=true)=0.3472 at without any evidences 
6. Simulation and results 
The structure of the Bayesian network as shown in Fig. 5 has been modeled now it requires specifying local 
probability distributions which are given in the form of Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs). To fill a CPT with 
appropriate numbers is often the hardest task when designing a Bayesian Network manually. The task often 
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becomes harder as a node's number of parents and possible states grows. The numbers used for the CPTs in this 
paper have not been assessed by domain experts and can most probably be improved on. However, the main focus 
here is on the approach rather than on specific numbers in the CPTs. Moreover, the threat value ordering is of higher 
importance than the threat values. Searching for a way to prioritize the engagement of friendly weapon systems is to 
the detected targets. Initially system does not have any evidences of detected target but get evidences at time to time 
such as target type, weapon range and weapon envelope. 
In the case of no evidence at all, Bayesian network outputs the prior probability P(Threat = true) = 0.3472 as 
shown in Fig. 6, which thereby also becomes the threat value. 
For a high threat case with a B-2 bomber within range of its weapon systems, at very close distance and with very 
short time before hit, the threat value becomes 0.8429 as shown in Fig. 7. Similarly, for a low threat value with a 
Boeing 747 at very far distance with very long time before hit, the threat value becomes 0.0446 as shown in Fig. 
8.Similarly threat value with a unknown target at high speed, close distance, and short TBH, the threat value 
becomes 65.93 as shown in Fig. 9. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  P(threat=true)=0.8429 at B2 target Type, within weapon envelope, very close distance, and very short TBH as given evidences 
 
 
Fig. 8.  P(threat=true)=0.0446 at B747 target Type, very far distance, and very long TBH as given evidences 
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Fig. 9.  Bayesian Network with Monitor Windows of Threat Evaluation for Dynamic Targets with Speed, Distance, and TBH as evidences, 
P(threat=true)=65.93 
7.  Conclusions and future work 
For threat evaluation in Bayesian Network, various parameters have considered to build the Bayesian model. A 
target to a defended asset clearly is related to both capability and intent parameters. The range of a target's weapon 
systems and the distance between the target and the defended asset are interrelated, since a target is more threatening 
to a defended asset if the defended asset is within the range of its weapon systems, than if it is outside it. The 
number of nodes, and thereby the complexity of the Bayesian network, have been limited in order to make it easier 
to analyze and validate the proposed model. The implemented threat evaluation system can apply to an air defense 
scenario. This system can enable in radar, aircraft, etc. An analysis of the system's threat value calculations shows 
that the proposed Bayesian Network model works well for dynamically moving targets.  
As future work, introduce more nodes as evidence parameters such as use of countermeasures and fire control 
radar, and whether the air target is classified as friend, foe, or neutral etc should be added to the Bayesian Network 
to get more accurate threat value.  
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